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I. INTRODUCTION
The past few years have been all but revolutionary for Myanmar.
In 2010, the country held its first elections after decades of rule by a
military junta. Shortly thereafter, Nobel Peace Prize recipient and
leader of the National League for Democracy (“NLD”), Aung San
Suu Kyi, was released from house arrest after fifteen years. In 2012,
she won a seat in the country’s parliament, and at the World
Economic Forum in Nay Pyi Taw in 2013, she announced her
interest in running for office of President of Myanmar.1 But in spite
of its progress, Myanmar is still a country best known for its
bureaucratic inefficiency and corruption. In 2012, it ranked 172 out
of 183 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption
Perception Index.2 After decades of junta rule, the military still
influences all sectors of the economy and government; furthermore,
according to analysts, strong links exist between the ruling elite and
organized crime.3 The 2010 and 2012 elections, while milestone
events, were reportedly mired in fraud and irregularities.4 According
1. Aung San Suu Kyi, Statement to Nik Gowing of BBC News at the World
Economic Forum for East Asia (June 6, 2012).
2. Corruption
Perceptions
Index
2012,
TRANSPARENCY
INT’L,
http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2012/results/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2013).
3. Overview of Corruption in Burma (Myanmar), ANTI-CORRUPTION
RESOURCE CENTRE (2012), http://issuu.com/cmi-norway/docs/349/7?e=1246952/
2680739 (noting the prevalence of trafficking in narcotics, people, wildlife, gems,
and timber, and alleging that “[c]ollusion between traffickers and Burma’s ruling
military junta . . . allows organised crime to function with virtual impunity”).
4. See id. at 3 (pointing to independent candidates’ reports of harassment and
restrictions placed on opposition political parties such as high registration fees,
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to skeptics, cronyism and illegal payments to bureaucrats are still the
way business gets done in Myanmar. Compounding the problem,
nascent democratic institutions lack the strength and system of
checks and balances to effectively curb corruption or expel corrupt
officials.5
The new reformist government, elected in 2010 and led by Thein
Sein (a former member of the military junta), has vowed to tackle
corruption as an impediment to the fledgling democracy’s growth
and development. The military junta primarily employed corruption
charges to eliminate political threats,6 but the new government has
recently initiated seemingly legitimate corruption investigations. In
January 2013, Myanmar charged Thein Tun, a former
telecommunications minister, and dozens of other government
officials as part of an investigation into corruption in the country’s
telecommunications industry; Thein Tun was placed under house
arrest.7 According to reports, the telecommunications industry in
Myanmar is particularly corrupt—with SIM cards costing
approximately $250, versus just $1.50 in neighboring countries,8 and
with pre-paid SIM cards often unable to be re-charged.9
denied access to the state media, and constrained elections monitoring).
5. See Corruption Perceptions Index 2012, supra note 2 (remarking that, in
lieu of checks and balances, the institutions that Myanmar has in place to stave off
corruption appear to be outdated and undeveloped, making them more likely to be
improperly taken advantage of for political gain).
6. Embassy Rangoon, Cable 04RANGOON1462, The Burmese Regime Airs
Its Dirty Laundry: Former PM “Corrupt and Insubordinate” (Nov. 12, 2004),
available
at http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=04RANGOON1462
(opining that the military regime charged former prime minister Khin Nyunt with
corruption as an excuse to remove him based on a long-standing hatred and fear
associated with a military intelligence apparatus that knew no limits and focused
attention not only on overt threats to the status quo, but also on the regime itself).
7. Aung Hla Tun, Myanmar Launches Major Graft Probe at Telecoms
Ministry, REUTERS, Jan. 24 2013, available at uk.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=
UKL4N0AT29I20130124 (reporting that this major investigation of government
officials and workers came one month after President Thein Sein vowed to clean
up corruption and that it is part of an effort that freed hundreds of political
prisoners, relaxed censorship laws, and helped hold free elections).
8. See id. at 1 (noting that these prices are some of the world’s most
expensive).
9. See Ko Tha Dja, SIM Card Corruption in Burma Stalls Progress,
DISSIDENT VOICE (Sept. 23, 2013), http://dissidentvoice.org/2013/09/sim-cardcorruption-in-burma-stalls-progress/ (detailing low-level corruption in the
Myanmar telecommunications market and explaining that certain SIM cards must
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In January 2013, the government also formed an anti-corruption
committee,10 and in June 2013, a two-day workshop was held in Nay
Phi Taw to discuss rewriting the country’s antiquated Suppression of
Corruption Act of 1948.11 A statement from the Home Ministry
called for public participation in the elimination of corruption.12
Public participation to end corruption may be a tall order in a
country where the per capita GDP (adjusted for purchasing power
parity) in 2012 was just $1,400 (203 out of 229 in the world).13
Poverty is undoubtedly linked to corruption in Myanmar, and the
new government may have a difficult time convincing its struggling
people that the fight against corruption is worth their time. The
Dodd-Frank Act, recently passed in the United States could prove
instructive to Myanmar’s government as it attempts to shift public
attitudes surrounding corruption.

A. GLOBAL IMPACT OF CORRUPTION
Corruption is a global problem. The World Bank estimates $20–
$40 billion are stolen in and from developing countries every year.14
The lives of Mu’ammar Qadhafi, Charles Taylor, Slobodan
Milosevic, and Sani Abacha are high-profile examples of the toll that
global corruption exacts on the developing world, but lower-profile
be activated within fourteen days of purchase or the user must pay a fee to unlock
the card).
10. See Myanmar Establishes Anti-Corruption Committee, THE NATION, Jan. 9,
2013, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/breakingnews/Myanmar-establishes-anticorruption-committee-30197566.html (quoting President Thein Sein’s announcing,
“As part of efforts for the emergence of good governance and clean government
after the new government took office, an action committee against corruption is
formed to fight the corruption and bribery in governmental organisations”).
11. See Myanmar Holds Workshop on Drafting Anti-Corruption Bill, GLOBAL
TIMES (July 30, 2013), www.globaltimes.cn/content/792582.shtml#.UlnGjFCko_A
(reporting that the workshop focused on parliament’s obligations under the U.N.
Convention Against Corruption).
12. See id. at 1 (stating that the Home Ministry believes that clean government
can be achieved with the help of public participation and that citizens should report
bribery cases to the Bureau of Special Investigation and Head Office of the Home
Ministry).
13. Burma, CIA WORLD FACTBOOK (Sept. 10, 2013), https://www.cia.g
ov/library/publications /the-world- factbook/geos /bm.html.
14. Stolen Assets and Development, STOLEN ASSET RECOVERY INITIATIVE,
www1.worldbank.org/finance/star_site/stolen-assets.html (last visited Feb. 7,
2013).
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examples—e.g., bribery of local police and bridges that are never
built (or are built poorly)—exact just as high a toll and may be
harder to root out. Until now, most of the work fighting global
corruption and recovering stolen assets has been the work of
government agencies and intergovernmental organizations.15

B. INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO FIGHT CORRUPTION
The U.N. Convention Against Corruption obliges signatory
governments to return illicit assets to their rightful owners.16
Governments often work together to find, freeze, and return assets
stolen by corrupt officials.17 The World Bank and the U.N. Office of
Drugs and Crime have also partnered to create the Stolen Asset
Recovery Initiative (“StAR”) which works with developing countries
and financial centers to prevent money laundering and to help trace
and recover the proceeds of grand corruption.18 Many countries also
have their own bribery laws aimed at national and multinational
corporations within their borders.

C. AMERICAN EFFORTS TO FIGHT CORRUPTION: DODD-FRANK
In 2010, the United States passed a novel law that could
permanently change the landscape of the fight against global
corruption by enlisting the services of private individuals: the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“DoddFrank”).19 Though it made headlines throughout the United States
when it passed, few news outlets highlighted what may become a
lasting legacy of the law: democratizing the fight against corruption.
Buried in Dodd-Frank is language amending the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (“FCPA”) – the United States’ version of anti-bribery
15. See, e.g., Anti-Corruption Links, ACT AGAINST CORRUPTION,
www.actagainstcorruption.org/actagainstcorruption/en/resources/index.html (last
visited Oct. 12, 2013).
16. U.N. Convention Against Corruption arts. 51, 57, Oct. 31, 2003, G.A. Res.
58/4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/4.
17. E.g., Mark V. Vlasic & Gregory Cooper, Fast Cash: Recovering Stolen
Assets, AMERICAS Q. (2010), available at http://www.americasquarterly.org/
node/1901 (detailing cooperation between Swiss, Haitian, and StAR officials in
recovering assets that former Haitian president Jean-Claude Duvalier had stolen).
18. Stolen Assets and Development, supra note 14.
19. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. §
5301 (2010).
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legislation—awarding whistleblowers potentially millions of dollars
for tipping off the U.S. government to corruption by and bribery of
foreign officials.20
For centuries, under the Alien Tort Statute, the United States has
provided aliens with the right to be compensated for violations of
international law.21 Now, under the FCPA, private citizens will also
have the right to be compensated for helping stop corruption. In
other words, for the first time, private citizens will have a stake in—
and an avenue for reaching—the global fight against corruption.
This paper will argue that, through the Dodd-Frank amendments to
the FCPA, the United States has provided a possible model legal
framework—including for countries like Myanmar—for expanding
state resources in the fight against global corruption by solving the
collective action problem and incentivizing individual participation
in a realm that has traditionally been the exclusive purview of state
actors. Part II will discuss the state of global corruption in 2012 and
the U.S. legal framework for fighting that corruption. Part III will
argue that information inequalities and opportunity costs have
hampered efforts to fight international impunity. Dodd-Frank seeks
to mitigate both of these problems by solving the collective action
problem and enlisting the support of private actors. Part III will also
briefly discuss how solving the collective action problem has
adjusted the balance of interests under the public choice theory and
why governmental discretion is imperative to the success of the new
U.S. model framework. We conclude by arguing that the
Government in Myanmar could find the Dodd-Frank anti-corruption
framework to be a useful model for deputizing citizens in the fight
against corruption.

20. FCPA: A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Nov. 14, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/
guide.pdf [hereinafter Resource Guide to the FCPA] (noting that Dodd-Frank
added Section 21F to the Exchange Act to authorize the SEC to provide monetary
awards to certain eligible whistleblowing individuals).
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1789).

2014]

MYANMAR AND THE DODD-FRANK ACT

447

II. FIGHTING INTERNATIONAL CORRUPTION IN
THE UNITED STATES
A. THE CURRENT STATE OF GLOBAL CORRUPTION
The worst corruption often occurs in political parties, the
bureaucracy, and the legislature,22 but petty corruption, or bribery, is
perhaps the most prevalent. One in four people worldwide report
having paid a bribe, most often to police and most often to avoid
trouble with authorities or to “speed things up.”23 Bribery is the most
widespread in Sub-Saharan Africa, where over half of individuals
report having paid a bribe.24
Furthermore, corruption is not going away in the twenty-first
century. Over half of respondents to a 2010 survey thought that
corruption had increased over the past three years, with the greatest
increases coming from the European Union (seventy-three percent of
respondents believe that corruption increased) and North American
countries (sixty-seven percent).25 In 2011, Transparency International
found that highly corrupt countries—of which there were more than
sixty—outnumbered the countries mostly free from corruption.26
Myanmar, considered by some as one of those highly corrupt
countries, ranked 180 out of the 183 countries and territories
surveyed by Transparency International in 2011 and received a score
of 1.5 out of 10.0 on the Corruption Perceptions Index.27 The
22. See uanita Ria o et al., Global Corruption Barometer 2010,
TRANSPARENCY INT’L 8–9 (2010), http://www.transparency.de/fileadmin/pdfs/
Wissen/Korruptionsindices/GCB_2010.pdf (using survey responses to show an
overwhelming global perception that political parties are most corrupt, closely
followed by public servants, parliaments, and the police).
23. Id. at 12–13, 19 (examining responses of 77,000 users of nine basic
services—customs, education, the judiciary, land-related services, medical
services, the police, registry and permit services, tax authorities, and utilities, and
finding one out of four respondents have paid a bribe in the past year).
24. See id. at 16–17 (finding that fifty-six percent of users of the nine basic
services in Sub-Saharan Africa admit to having paid a bribe to a service provider).
25. See id. at 5 (noting that while corruption may have increased most in
Western Europe and the United States, corruption is also expanding globally, with
forty-five percent of respondents believing that corruption had increased in Russia
and the former Soviet Union, and fifty-seven percent of respondents believing
corruption had increased in the Middle East and North Africa).
26. Corruption Perceptions Index 2012, supra note 2, at 4.
27. Id.
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country’s porous border and lack of effective anti-corruption
institutions have made Myanmar a prime target for trafficking in
narcotics, people, wildlife, and other contraband. In 2006, the World
Bank estimated that illegal logging harvest rates in Myanmar could
exceed legal harvest rates by as much as eighty percent, and joint
ventures between foreign and state-owned oil and gas firms, which
are mandated by domestic law, lack transparency and accountability.
Moreover, Myanmar is the primary source for amphetamine-type
stimulants in Asia, and, according to U.S. Department of State’s
estimates, several thousand citizens of Myanmar are victims of
human trafficking each year—both internal and international
trafficking.28 Citizens of highly corrupt countries often believe
government efforts to fight corruption are ineffective. Despite the
increase in corruption and these perceptions of ineffectiveness,
people still believe the media and governments are crucial to fighting
global corruption.29 Consequently, many countries and regions have
begun building anti-corruption coalitions and transparency
initiatives. The United States, in part out of a concern that its
businesses might be left behind in unfair competitions, has been a
major driving force in building these coalitions and initiatives.
In 1996, members of the Organization of American States
(“OAS”) adopted the Inter-American Convention Against
Corruption, which commits its members to standardize their criminal
anti-corruption laws.30 Then, in 1997, the Council of Europe’s
Committee of Ministers adopted twenty guiding principles for
compliance with the Council’s various anti-corruption conventions.31
Eleven African countries have adopted twenty-five anti-corruption

28. See generally Marie Chene, Overview of corruption in Burma (Myanmar),
U4 HELPDESK, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL,
(Oct.
1,
2012),
http://www.u4.no/publications/overview-of-corruption-in-burma-myanmar/.
29. See Ria o et al., supra note 22, at 24–26 (highlighting survey results that
reflect that the general public would most trust the media as the one institution
most likely to stop corruption).
30. Inter-American Convention Against Corruption art. 2, Mar. 29, 1996, 35
I.L.M. 724 (focusing on the need to “promote, facilitate and regulate cooperation
among State Parties . . . to eradicate corruption in the performance of public
functions”).
31. On the Twenty Guiding Principles for the Fight Against Corruption,
COUNCIL OF EUR. COMM. OF MINISTERS (Nov. 6, 1997), available at
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/documents/Resolution(97)24_EN.pdf.
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principles as part of the Global Coalition for Africa.32 And in Asia,
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation promotes government
transparency and accountability reforms to create better investment
climates.33 Moreover, thirty-nine countries have signed the
Organization for Economic and Cultural Development’s (“OECD”)
Convention, which requires each country to enact strong anticorruption legislation.34
International organizations have also been active in the fight
against global corruption. The U.N., the World Bank, and the
International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) have stated that corruption
impedes economic growth and have established units to help fight
corruption.35

B. THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
In 1977, the United States enacted the FCPA to counteract corrupt
behavior by American companies after a Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) investigation revealed illegal foreign payments
made by over 400 companies totaling over $300 million.36 Despite
Congress’ enactment of the FCPA, corruption skyrocketed by the
32. Fighting Global Corruption: Business Risk Management, U.S. DEP’T ST.
14 (2003), http://cdm16064.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p266901coll4/
id/2484 [hereinafter Fighting Global Corruption].
33. APEC Course of Action on Fighting Corruption and Ensuring
Transparency, ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION (Nov. 17–18, 2004),
available at http://www.apec.org/Groups/SOM-Steering-Committee-on-Economicand-Technical-Cooperation/Working-Groups/~/media/Files/Groups/ACT/04_
amm_033rev2.ashx.
34. OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions: Ratification Status as of 20 November
2012, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (Nov. 20, 2012),
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/antibriberyconventionratification.pdf.
35. Fighting Global Corruption, supra note 32, at 16 (noting that the World
Bank and the IMF have declared that corruption must be addressed in the context
of economic and financial evaluations and assistance programs to combat its
deterrent effects).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (1998); Resource Guide to the FCPA, supra note 20,
at 3 (citing U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 94TH CONG., REP. OF THE SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES
2–3
(1976),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/sec-reportquestionable-illegal-corporate-payments-practices-1976.pdf)
(explaining
that
companies falsified corporate financial records to hide illegal payments made to
U.S. political campaigns and to foreign officials abroad from secret “slush funds”).
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early 2000s: between 1994 and 2001, foreign firms from fifty
countries allegedly paid bribes in over 400 international contract
biddings.37 Though the pace of corruption has not slowed, the FCPA
has played an increasingly important role in deterring corrupt
conduct. In recent years, single cases have yielded penalties of
hundreds of millions of dollars.38
The FCPA makes it unlawful for any U.S. person—natural person,
juridical person, or one acting on their behalf—to bribe a foreign
official (or candidate for office) to obtain or retain business.39 The
statute is written broadly so most people and companies with some
connection to the United States, including foreign firms who act in
furtherance of a corrupt payment while in the United States, fall
within its scope.40 This “Business Purpose Test” is interpreted
broadly to apply even when the business being obtained or retained
is not associated directly with a foreign government.41
The Act exempts payments made to facilitate, expedite, or secure
the performance of routine government action—such as expediting
the processing of visas or permits, or obtaining police protection or
phone services.42 It also provides several affirmative defenses,
including (1) that the action was lawful under the laws of the country
in which it was performed, despite how highly unlikely it is that any
other country’s laws permit bribery, or (2) the action involved a bona
fide expenditure.43
The U.S. Department of ustice (“DO ”) and the SEC are charged
37. Fighting Global Corruption, supra note 32, at 3 (noting that bribing firms
were competing for contracts valued at a total of $200 billion).
38. Mike Koehler, FCPA 101, How Are FCPA Fines, Penalties, and Sentences
Calculated?, FCPA PROFESSOR (2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/fcpa101#q17 (setting forth the largest corporate FCPA settlements); see, e.g., Resource
Guide to the FCPA, supra note 20, at 22 (highlighting the FCPA’s explicit
prohibition on payments made through third parties and pointing to a prosecution
of four multi-national corporations, which relied on third parties to bribe Nigerian
officials, that resulted in $1.7 billion in civil and criminal sanctions).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a).
40. Resource Guide to the FCPA, supra note 20, at 10.
41. Id. at 12.
42. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(b), (f)(3).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c) (defining bona fide expenditures as including travel
and lodging payments either related generally to the promotion of products or
services, or related to the execution or performance of a contract with the foreign
government).
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with and effectively carry out enforcement of the FCPA. Penalties
for violating the FCPA bribery and accounting provisions are heavy
and are generally increased for willful violations.44 Corporate
violators may be suspended or debarred from competing in the
federal procurement process and may face heavy criminal fines, up
to $2 million, for each violation.45 Individual violators, on the other
hand, may face criminal fines of up to $100,000 or five years in
prison.46 Additionally, the government can bring a civil suit for up to
$10,000 per violation by both individuals and corporations.47
Moreover, the Alternative Fines Act can increase penalties to twice
the pecuniary benefit sought by violating the Act. The Act also
allows courts, at their discretion, to impose additional fines equaling
or exceeding the defendant’s pecuniary gain.48
No private cause of action exists under the FCPA, but violations of
the Act may also fall within the scope of federal racketeering laws,
which do have private causes of action.49 Corrupt behaviors also
include violations of U.S. mail and wire fraud statutes, the Travel
Act, or state bribery statutes.50

C. THE DODD-FRANK FINANCIAL REFORM LEGISLATION AND
REGULATIONS
In July 2010, President Barack Obama signed the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which mandates a
series of financial regulatory reforms, intended to prevent a
recurrence of an event like the “Great Recession” of 2008–2009.51
Section 92252 of Dodd-Frank amended the FCPA by adding
44. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff.
45. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(c)(1)(A).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(c)(2)(A).
47. Id.; Resource Guide to the FCPA, supra note 20, at 69.
48. Resource Guide to the FCPA, supra note 20, at 68.
49. Id. at 48.
50. Id. at 48–49.
51. 12 U.S.C. § 5301 (“An act to promote the financial stability of the United
States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end
‘too big to fail’, to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect
consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other purposes.”).
52. See id. §§ 748, 922 (Section 922 amends the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, applies specifically to corruption in the securities industry, and is most likely
to be used in FCPA actions; Section 748, on the other hand, amends the
Commodities Exchange Act to provide the same whistleblowing incentives as
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monetary incentives to encourage individuals to report bribery of
foreign officials.53 If an individual54 voluntarily provides the
government with original information about a violation of the FCPA,
and if that information leads to monetary sanctions of $1 million or
more,55 then the individual shall be awarded ten to thirty percent of
the sanctions.56 The SEC has complete discretion to determine the
amount awarded and will consider, among other things, the
significance of the information, the degree of assistance it provided,
and the government’s interest in deterring future violations to make
its determination.57 However, no award will be given to individuals
who knowingly and willfully provide false information.58
Sensitive to fears of retaliation against those who report abuses by
their companies, the legislation also strengthens the whistleblower
protections in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 200259 and allows for
anonymous reporting.60 If an individual wishes, he can anonymously
Section 922).
53. See generally id. § 922.
54. See id. (noting that the legislation and ensuing regulations place some
restrictions on which individual can receive an award for reporting FCPA
violations, while the largest category of restrictions is on individuals who obtained
the original information through an internal investigation they were legally
obligated to conduct; the legislation also bars employees of certain governmental
agencies and self-regulatory organizations from receiving awards under the new
FCPA framework); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(c)(2) (2006) (defining the type of action the
Commission will take, pursuant to securities laws, in response to monetary
sanctions of $1 million or more).
55. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)(1) (stating that the statutory language includes
judgments, settlements, and other forms of sanctions, thus, the government cannot
avoid paying awards by settling cases prior to a judgment against the defendant).
56. See id. (providing that the size of the whistleblower-employer’s award is
determined based on the aggregate monetary sanctions imposed on the violative
employer following a successful enforcement action).
57. See id. § 78u-6(c)(1)(B) (stipulating that the Commission is not to consider
the balance of the payout fund).
58. Id. § 78u-6(i).
59. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 15, 18, 28, 29 U.S.C.).
60. See id. § 78u-6(d)(1)–(2), (h) (providing that a whistleblower-employee,
who seeks to remain anonymous, may instead be represented by counsel, so long
as the employee submits probative information for his claim; Section 78u-(h)
provides that the Commission may not disclose information that would reveal the
identity of an anonymous whistleblower-employee, except in specific enumerated
circumstances, in which disclosure is mandatory as part of an official public
proceeding).
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provide the Commission with original information through counsel,
though counsel will be required to reveal the client’s identity prior to
the disbursement of any award.61 The legislation also includes strict
confidentiality requirements and reinstatement, twice back-pay, as
well as costs of litigation for any whistleblower who experiences
retaliatory behavior.62
In August 2011, final regulations issued by the SEC took effect
and clarified some of the legislation’s provisions.63 Importantly, the
regulations do not require whistleblower-employees to report
information through their company’s internal compliance system
before disclosing it to the SEC.64 The regulations do, however,
incentivize internal reporting by providing the SEC with discretion to
consider the use of such procedures in determining award amounts.65
The business lobby continues to push for the use of internal
compliance procedures to be required, and on May 11, 2011,
Congressman Michael Grimm (R-NY) introduced legislation to
codify that policy.66
The

regulations

also

define

“original

information”

and

61. Id. § 78u-6(d)(1)–(2) (providing that if whistleblower-employees wish to
remain anonymous, they must be represented by counsel).
62. Id. § 78u-6(h) (providing that a whistleblower-employee must bring an
employer retaliation claim within six years after the violative act occurred, or
within three years after the basis for his claim becomes known, or reasonably
should have been known).
63. See generally Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed.
Reg. 34300, 34300–84 (June 13, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249)
(establishing the compliance dates for the finalized rules applicable to the DoddFrank Act).
64. See John W. White et al., SEC Adopts Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Rules,
CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE (May 26, 2011), available at
http://www.cravath.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Publications/3288716_1.pdf
(commenting that whistleblower-employees are now required to disclose the
information to the SEC within a 120-day window of reporting the violation via
internal mechanisms).
65. Id. at 2 (declaring that whistleblower-employees under the Dodd-Frank Act
now may circumvent their company’s internal compliance system by bringing their
claims privately; moreover, the SEC may enforce the Act’s anti-retaliation
protections if the whistleblower-employee is discharged or discriminated against as
the result of coming forward); see also 76 Fed. Reg. at 34322 (providing that
where an FCPA action leads to multiple whistleblower claimants, the Commission
will consider several factors listed in the final regulations to determine the
appropriate allocation of the award).
66. See White, supra note 64, at 3.
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“information that leads to successful enforcement.” Original
information must be derived from the whistleblower’s independent
knowledge and analysis and, intuitively, must not already be known
by the SEC.67 The definition generally excludes information held by
officers, directors, auditors, and lawyers who obtained it while
performing internal investigations, though these individuals can
provide information from internal investigations in limited
circumstances.68 Information leading to a successful action must be
specific, credible, and timely and must have some effect on the
Commission’s investigative efforts.69 That is, it either must cause the
staff to start or reopen an FCPA action, pursue a new channel in an
ongoing investigation, or significantly contribute to an ongoing
investigation.70 If an individual whistleblower provides information
satisfying one of these criteria to his company and, after an internal
investigation, the company ultimately discloses the information to
the SEC, then the whistleblower will have preserved his “place in
line” and will be eligible for compensation.71
The FCPA amendments have already had an effect on the fight
against global corruption: the quantity and quality of tips has
increased since Dodd-Frank’s enactment.72 Time will tell whether
67. See 76 Fed. Reg. at 34310–11 (providing that original information must not
arise from allegations made during judicial or administrative hearings, government
sources, or the media reports, unless the whistleblower-employee is the source of
such allegations).
68. Id. at 34318–19 (including situations in which (1) the individual reasonably
believes reporting is necessary to prevent substantial harm to the corporation or its
investors, (2) the individual reasonably believes his company is attempting to
impede the internal investigation, or (3) the individual has reported the information
to his company and the company has failed to take action after 120 days).
69. See White, supra note 64 (commenting that original information must
“sufficiently contribute” to the success of actions currently being enforced, or
under investigation).
70. Id. (noting that the final SEC rules were designed to create added
incentives for whistleblower-employees to take action via internal mechanisms).
71. Id. at 3 (commenting that the increasingly costly financial incentives under
the Dodd-Frank Act should motivate companies to improve their own internal
compliance mechanisms and investigation procedures).
72. Id. at 1 (observing that the number of whistleblower reports submitted to
the SEC has substantially increased since the Dodd-Frank Act became law). But
see Mike Koehler, The Financial Reform Bill’s Whistleblower Provisions and the
FCPA, FCPA PROFESSOR (July 20, 2010), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/thefinancial-reform-bills-whistleblower-provisions-and-the-fcpa (predicting that the
new whistleblower provisions would have a negligible impact on FCPA
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FCPA prosecutions and settlements will improve correspondingly.

III. CONVINCING AND ALLOWING PRIVATE
INDIVIDUALS TO FIGHT CORRUPTION
Plagued by financial scandals and the influence of money in
politics, in 2010 the United States slipped out of Transparency
International’s list of the top twenty least corrupt countries. It fell to
twenty-second place behind, among others, Canada (6), Barbados
(17), and Chile (21).73 That said, FCPA enforcement has recently
become a high priority for the Administration, Department of Justice,
and SEC.74 In December 2008 and February 2009, the government
secured penalties of $800 million and $579 million in two cases. 75
Then, in January 2010, the SEC formed an FCPA Specialty Unit,
with instructions to start using cooperative agreements and
agreements not to prosecute to encourage individuals to help the
Commission gather information.76 Around the same time, the
Department of Justice increased its FCPA staff, and twenty-two
FCPA-related arrests were made at a Las Vegas trade show. 77
Moreover, eight of the top ten settlements in FCPA history occurred
in 2010, and eight companies paid a total of $1.6 billion in
penalties.78 The government also increased the number of actions it
enforcement); Mike Koehler, Friday Roundup, FCPA PROFESSOR (Dec. 21, 2012),
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/friday-roundup-63 (pointing out that “[o]f the 3,001
whistleblower tips received by the SEC in FY2012, 3.8% (115) related to the
FCPA [and] in FY2011 (a partial reporting year) 3.9% of the 334 tips received by
the SEC related to the FCPA”).
73. See Dave Graham, U.S. Slips to Historic Low in Global Corruption Index,
REUTERS, Oct. 26, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/10/26/us-corruptiontransparency-idUSTRE69P0X620101026.
74. Fredric D. Firestone & Michael A. Ungar, DOJ and SEC Will Significantly
Increase FCPA Enforcement Efforts, MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY (Mar. 11,
2012), http://www.mwe.com/index.cfm/fuseaction/publications.nldetail/object_id/
c2bea4e1-2573-4e83-b0bf-8086e0001d96.cfm.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. (reporting that the twenty-two arrests concerned executives and
employees in the defense and law enforcement products industry).
78. See Andrew Longstreth, Fight Brews over Anti-Bribery Laws as Fines
Jump, REUTERS, Sept. 15, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/15/usfcpa-lobbying-idUSTRE78E7JK20110915 (noting that for the first twenty years of
its history, the FCPA was rarely if ever enforced, but has seen a boom in recent
years); see also 2010 Year-End FCPA Update, GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER 2–3
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initiated: 2010 saw an eighty-five percent increase year-on-year in
the number of actions.79

A. THE COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEM AND THE FIGHT AGAINST
CORRUPTION
Changes made to the FCPA highlight the federal government’s
increased focus on the fight against global corruption. By possibly
solving the collective action problem, Dodd-Frank provides private
individuals with a reason and a financial incentive to take action
against global corruption. The amendments potentially allow a
person to “do good and do well.” In so doing, it also solves, or at
least lessens, the information inequalities that hamper government
efforts, thus expanding the fight against impunity and making it more
efficient. Because Dodd-Frank helps solve the collective action
problem, private individuals are able to get involved in the fight,
meaning that global corruption may actually start to decrease.
In many ways, the government’s anti-corruption efforts have been
inhibited by opportunity costs and information inequalities. The
Dodd-Frank amendments have the potential to mitigate both. Even
with a high percentage of companies willing to cooperate with
authorities, FCPA investigations are costly.80 Investigations require a
serious investment of U.S. taxpayer-sponsored treasure and manhours, possibly years, before any benefit is reaped.81 More
importantly, investigations are economically costly, as resources
(Jan. 3, 2011), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/
2010YearEndFCPAUpdate.pdf [hereinafter 2010 FCPA Update] (explaining the
number of enforcement actions in 2010 reached a record high of seventy-four
actions brought by the Department of Justice and the SEC, eclipsing the previous
high of thirty-eight actions in 2007).
79. See 2010 FCPA Update, supra note 78, at 3 (explaining that the dramatic
increase in enforcement actions over the past decade may be attributed to increases
in departmental resources allocated to FCPA enforcement at the DOJ and SEC, as
well as the enactment of several key pieces of legislation).
80. See Thomas Fox, Top Ten FCPA Investigations of 2010, INFOSEC ISLAND
(Jan. 7, 2011), http://www.infosecisland.com/blogview/10663-Top-Ten-FCPAInvestigations-of-2010.html (arguing that there are no statistics available on how
much it costs the government to run an FCPA investigation, but there are good
statistics suggesting that private corporations running internal investigations spend
millions of dollars on them).
81. Id. (inferring that these two examples are on the higher end, but they
demonstrate the financial demands of conducting FCPA investigations).
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devoted to one investigation cannot be devoted to another. This
opportunity cost is a major inhibition on effectively combating
global corruption, especially in an era when government resources
are stretched to the limit and potential violators know there is a lower
risk of being caught.82
The fight has also suffered from information inequalities that
make investigations lengthier, more costly, and less likely to
succeed. Corporate insiders and employees are the most likely to be
aware of FCPA violations—whether through general corporate
knowledge, personal knowledge, or internal compliance and
reporting mechanisms—but are, for reasons discussed below, the
least likely to share that information with the government. Thus, the
SEC and DOJ are often forced to initiate costly investigations with
incomplete information.83 This undoubtedly leads to either longer,
more costly investigations, unnecessary investigations, or
investigations that are stopped prematurely due to lack of evidence.
The information inequality is exacerbated by the collective action
problem, which impedes individuals from cooperating with the
government to fight corruption. Consider an employee at a
multinational corporation with original information about her
employer’s FCPA violations.84 Such an employee would be unlikely
to disclose her information to the federal government for fear of
82. See FCPA and FCA Backlogs and the DOJ Elephant in the Room,
MCGRATH & GRACE, LTD., http://mcgrathgrace.com/component/content/article/9blog/84-fcpa-and-fca-backlogs-and-the-doj-elephant-in-the-room.html (last visited
Nov. 21, 2013) (observing that the DOJ’s limited resources are being stretched thin
by the increasingly high volume of FCPA and FCA actions, causing government
fraud investigations to last up to two years).
83. See, e.g., Barbara Crutchfield George & Kathleen A. Lacey, Investigation
of Halliburton Co./TSKJ’s Nigerian Business Practices: Model for Analysis of the
Current Anti-Corruption Environment on Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Enforcement, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 503, 504 (2006) (detailing the
expansive scope of the investigation of a Halliburton subsidiary in Nigeria, which
started as a French government-led probe into minor allegations of fraud and
rapidly developed into a major SEC investigation).
84. See William McLucas et al., Get Ahead of the Bus or Be Hit by the Bus:
Practical Strategies for Mitigating the Risks of the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower
Program, 44 BLOOMBERG BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1, 3 (noting that the cost
calculation would be similar for individual, rather than corporate actors, though the
potential costs would be more social and less economic—that is, individual actors
would likely be less concerned with employment retaliation and potentially more
concerned with social retaliation).
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serious reprisals. Her employer could fire her, or, alternatively, could
reassign her into oblivion and encourage her to quit. She could be
blackballed from her chosen industry and could risk becoming a
social pariah as a “snitch.”
Unlike these concentrated potential costs, the benefits of the
employee’s information disclosure would be widely disbursed, and
she would likely receive little, if any, of the benefit of her own
actions. To the extent that less global corruption means lower costs
of doing business, prices of goods would decrease, but those benefits
would be distributed between consumers worldwide. Profits would
increase, but those benefits would be distributed between investors
worldwide. Thus, if the employee is neither an investor nor a
consumer, she would receive essentially none of the benefits of her
actions. For example, if an American employee’s contribution to the
fight against global corruption were to lead to a more transparent
contracting process for Russian infrastructure, she would likely
receive no benefit. The concentrated costs and disbursed benefits of
providing corruption tips create a strong disincentive for private
individuals to cooperate freely with the government.85 Even if
potential whistleblowers would receive a general, societal benefit
from decreased corruption, they would still likely be dissuaded from
acting because of the possible preference to be free-riders and wait
for someone else to take action.86
But Dodd-Frank takes an unprecedented step to increase the power
of the global fight against corruption by providing private actors with
an incentive and a means to contribute. The fight against corruption
has, until now, been carried out by states and intergovernmental
organizations rather than by private individuals.87 Non-governmental
85. But see Chinyere Ajanwachuku, Comment, An In-House Counsel’s
Decision to Whistleblow, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 379, 399 (2012)
(demonstrating that a whistleblower-employee will decide to report violations
based on a variety of factors ranging from financial incentives to a perceived
ethical obligation to clients).
86. See Mark Pieth, Collective Action and Corruption 14 (Basel Inst. on
Governance, Working Paper, No. 13, 2013), available at http://www.collectiveaction.com/sites/default/files/120915_WP%2013_Collective%20Action%20and%
20corruption_Pieth_final.pdf (arguing that the collective action problem may deter
employees from reporting violations, even if it is foreseeable that law enforcement
will eventually crack down on their companies, whether they take action or not).
87. White, supra note 64, at 1 (commenting on the increasing prevalence of
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organizations have also contributed to the fight as watchdogs and
informers, but they have little ability to directly deter corruption.88
Dodd-Frank is, therefore, fairly unprecedented because it
incentivizes private individuals to contribute to an area that has
traditionally been state-controlled. The FCPA still contains no
private cause of action, but the recent amendments nevertheless
provide a substantial means for private involvement in and influence
over state actions.89
The amendments take this unprecedented step not by adding a new
avenue for private participation—though presumably, private
individuals could always have disclosed information to the
government—but by adding an incentive that had been lacking. The
“new FCPA” effectively counters the collective action problem by
both reducing the concentrated costs of taking action and
consolidating the expected benefits. Whereas previously, a
whistleblower bore the serious financial risk of retaliation, now he
bears only the social costs. Although the Dodd-Frank retaliation
protections are not a guarantee against retaliation or of full
compensation, the provision of reinstatement, twice back-pay, and
litigation costs should decrease and distribute the risks of taking
action.
In addition, the new FCPA significantly consolidates the benefits
that private actors can expect to gain from their work. A
whistleblower with valuable information can still expect to gain the
general benefits of reduced global corruption that he always could,
but additionally, he or she can expect to receive thousands or
millions of dollars for his efforts. As described above, recent
individual whistleblowers in state and inter-governmental enforcement actions).
88. See Kathleen M. Hamann et. al., Developments in U.S. and International
Efforts to Prevent Corruption, 40 INT’L LAW. 417, 428–30 (2006) (nongovernmental organizations may design non-compliance policies, monitor fraud
investigations, and oversee the implementation of national and international
initiatives; however, they generally react responsively, rather than preemptively, to
instances of corruption).
89. Pieth, supra note 86, at 14 (noting that the United States’ model of solving
the collective action problem to greatly increase the resources available to fighting
grand corruption has the potential to be expanded and implemented in other
countries). The basic approach of seeking to decrease the free-rider problem by
solving the collective action problem will provide a general strategy for other
countries, which can tailor their specific approach to conditions on the ground.
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settlements and penalties have ranged from the hundreds of millions
to billions of dollars; a whistleblower receiving ten to thirty percent
of such a sanction will have his risks and costs more than
compensated. Dodd-Frank should, therefore, largely nullify the
collective action problem and encourage individual actors to join the
fight against global corruption.90

B. PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY AND FCPA LOBBYING
The increase in FCPA enforcement has led to the formation of a
powerful lobby against certain aspects of the Act. For example,
looking forward, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce plans to reshape its
agenda to make changing the FCPA one of its top priorities.91
Lobbying by business groups has intensified, as they claim that the
Act is an economic drag, which hurts American competitiveness.92
Human rights and anti-corruption-related lobby groups have
countered that fighting corruption actually decreases the costs of
doing business.93 In March 2012, perhaps in response to the intense
lobbying effort of business groups, the DOJ compromised with
business groups and agreed to issue more guidance on the law.94
By possibly countering the collective action problem, Dodd-Frank
may have also readjusted the balance of costs and benefits in the

90. The more pressing question now may be whether the amendments swing
the pendulum of the collective action problem too far, encouraging individuals to
report too many violations too often, thereby reducing the effectiveness of internal
compliance procedures; if individual awards are not balanced, it could increase the
incidence of false positives and drive up costs to consumers as companies attempt
to create insurance policies against huge sanctions.
91. Longstreth, supra note 78 (demonstrating that increased usage of the FCPA
in federal prosecutions has prompted legislators to reassess its viability in light of
the current economic landscape).
92. Id. (explaining how business lobbyists argue that foreign companies do not
encounter the same legal hurdles as other companies, which fall under the FCPA’s
purview).
93. See id. (observing that anti-corruption and human rights activists are
anxious that the Chamber of Commerce’s proposed amendments may lessen the
bite of the FCPA).
94. See Basil Katz, DOJ Official, US Chamber, to Discuss Enforcement of
Bribery Law, REUTERS, Mar. 16, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/16
/fcpa-guidance-idUSL2E8EGEQ720120316 (remarking that both the Chamber of
Commerce and several senators have argued for incorporating greater clarity and
consistency into the FCPA to illustrate how the law will be enforced in practice).
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lobbying process—as described in the public choice theory.95 The
costs of anti-corruption legislation are greatly concentrated on
multinational corporations, while the benefits are widely disbursed
among the consumer and investor class.96 Accordingly, businesses
have a strong incentive to lobby the government for a weaker FCPA
or at least weaker enforcement of a strong FCPA, or more clear
guidelines of a strong FCPA.97 Individual actors have a weak
incentive to take any action in favor of a strong FCPA because they
are not likely to be adequately compensated for their work.
However, Dodd-Frank has changed the public choice theory
balance by providing individuals with a strong monetary incentive to
take action in favor of strong anti-corruption legislation. By
concentrating and increasing the potential benefits of fighting
corruption, Dodd-Frank may actually strengthen the anti-corruption
lobby. In essence, Dodd-Frank has strengthened the fight against
global corruption not only by encouraging individuals to take part in
the fight but also by encouraging public interest groups to support a
strong legal framework. Time will tell if corporate groups embrace
this change and contribute greater resources and attention to
compliance officers and their anti-corruption programs.

C. USING SEC DISCRETION TO MAINTAIN A BALANCE OF
INTERESTS UNDER THE NEW FCPA
Individual actors’ ability to affect the fight against corruption
under the new FCPA is not unfettered. The largest limit on private
action in FCPA cases is the SEC’s complete discretion over
prosecuting actions and determining award amounts.98 That
95. See Zachary J. Gubler, Public Choice Theory and the Private Securities
Market, 91 N.C. L. REV. 745, 779–80 (2013) (remarking that the Dodd-Frank Act
and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act were both passed during politically dynamic, yet
turbulent economic periods, contrary to traditional public choice theory, which
states that laws and regulations are enacted as the result of the rational choices of
actors in the financial marketplace).
96. See id. at 782 (noting that before the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed, the
political power of corporate interest groups, like the Chamber of Commerce, began
to steadily ebb, creating space for unions, consumers, and other public interest
groups to assert themselves).
97. See id. at 792 (remarking that businesses may be more successful at
lobbying for changes in legislation after public interest in promoting economic
reform has declined).
98. See 12 U.S.C. § 922(a)(a)(5), (b)(1) (providing that the amount of award
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discretion is essential to maintaining the effectiveness of the new
framework.
If whistleblowers are widely seen as gaining windfall profits from
the pain of corporate shareholders, their peers may begin to search
for and report evidence of potential corruption, regardless of its
frivolity. Such behavior wastes government resources and does little,
if anything, to further the global fight against corruption; indeed, it
could actually impair the fight. Accordingly, complete SEC
discretion is required to ensure whistleblowing awards are meted out
fairly and in the manner least likely to cause false positives.
SEC discretion over FCPA actions also allows the government to
maintain control over its foreign policy objectives. FCPA actions
have undoubtedly impacted foreign policy in the past, but there was
little chance that the public could become involved in the action. The
Dodd-Frank amendments increased the likelihood of public
involvement and should thus increase the number of actions
brought.99 That increase could make the Act’s effect on foreign
policy more salient because suits against foreign companies or
accusations of U.S. allies having corrupt government officials could
disrupt American relations abroad.
The Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) creates a similar risk of disrupting
international affairs, but the State Department has countered that risk
by adopting a protocol of submitting letters to district courts involved
in ATS cases and asking them to dismiss the actions if they are
potentially harmful to foreign relations.100 The authors are unaware
of any State Department protocol requiring consultation with the
conferred will also be affected by the amount of sanctions obtained by regulatory
government agencies through related enforcement actions).
99. See Mike Delikat, Dodd-Frank’s Whistleblower Bounty Provisions: The
First Wave of Tips Filed with the SEC and What Public Companies Should Do
Now, 2012 A.B.A. SEC. LAB. & EMPL. L. EVENT REP. 2, available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/labor_law/2012/03/national_c
onference_on_equal_employment_opportunity_law/mw2012eeo_delikat.authchec
kdam.pdf (pointing out that the number of whistleblower tips will likely increase
as the Dodd-Frank Act’s award program gains more attention).
100. Cf. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 695 (2004) (noting that “the
potential implications for the foreign relations of the United States of recognizing
private causes of action for violating international law should make courts
particularly wary of impinging on the discretion of the Legislative and Executive
Branches in managing foreign affairs”).

2014]

MYANMAR AND THE DODD-FRANK ACT

463

SEC or DOJ prior to the initiation of FCPA actions. However, we
would not be surprised if such a process existed informally or if one
develops following the impending surge in FCPA tips and actions.
Nevertheless, Commission discretion allows the government to gain
resources under the new FCPA without completely ceding power
over foreign relations to private actors.

IV. APPLICATION TO MYANMAR AND
CONCLUSION
The FCPA is part of the United States’ securities regulation
infrastructure, and is implemented by a large bureaucracy in the SEC
and DOJ. Quite the opposite of the United States, Myanmar is in the
early stages of creating a regulatory framework and civil service; it
would, accordingly, be difficult and prohibitively costly for the
country to create and effectively implement an anti-corruption
framework on the scale of Dodd-Frank. This paper does not argue
that Myanmar should implement the Dodd-Frank framework as
constructed in the United States. Instead, it argues that the broad
model presented by Dodd-Frank—one in which individual citizens
are rewarded for whistleblower efforts (and, accordingly, one that
solves the collective action problem)—provides a starting point for
leaders in Myanmar seeking to reduce and eliminate corruption.
Given the cost and time necessary to create a large-scale civil
service, Myanmar’s government may find it more efficient to run its
anti-corruption efforts though its judiciary, whereas the Dodd-Frank
framework is run largely through the executive branch. Some
bureaucracy will likely be needed to protect against overreaching by
private citizens and to represent the government’s interest in anticorruption investigations and lawsuits.
The judicial system in Myanmar is, like the rest of the government
institutions, limited. The government may, nevertheless, find it easier
to reform the judiciary—which will likely itself involve anticorruption efforts—and create a small executive agency to lead its
anti-corruption efforts under the Dodd-Frank model, as opposed to
creating agencies on the scale of the SEC and the DOJ. Again,
Myanmar should focus not on the specifics of the Dodd-Frank
framework, but on the notion that involving and incentivizing private
citizens, who are often the ones paying the costs of corruption, in the
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fight against corruption can make that fight more effective, shorter
and, ultimately, less costly to the state.
If the United States believes that its model for fighting corruption
has the potential to be implemented around the world—and to
change the way we fight corruption around the world (which would
further the United States’ own social and economic foreign policy
goals)—it would be wise to work with Myanmar, a country that is
rapidly changing, especially as it emerges from a cash-based
economy to part of the global financial banking system. Indeed, the
country may be the United States’ best shot at testing its new regime
in the developing world, and that shot comes at a time when the
world is watching Myanmar’s every move, as the recent decision to
host the World Economic Forum there made clear.
Myanmar’s fledgling democracy has recently shown its
willingness to make drastic changes in a country mired in
authoritarianism and corruption. The election of Aung San Suu Kyi
trained the world’s eyes on Myanmar, making it potentially this
decade’s success story. If the country continues to root out
bureaucratic corruption and inefficiency, investors will likely flood it
with money. A legal framework similar to the FCPA could create
buy-in from citizens and incentivize their efforts to end corruption in
a country where, to some, extreme poverty makes corruption seem,
rightly or wrongly, like the least of the people’s problems. And if an
FCPA-type regime proves successful in Myanmar, at a time when so
many people are watching the country, it could revolutionize the way
we fight corruption in the developing world.

